jump to navigation

Freedom of Speech Based on Race: -First Amendment Affirmative Action July 21, 2006

Posted by C.A.R.D in affirmative action, Amendment, Asian, Bible, Bill of Rights, Black, Card, Catholics, Circuit Court, Citizens Against Racism and Discrimination, Discriminate, Discrimination, First, First amendment, First amendment affirmative action, Freedom, Freedom of Speech, Harper, Hispanic, Homosexual, Jewish, Latino, Muslim, Race, Racism, Religion, Sandra Day O'Connor, sexual orientation, Speech, Supreme Court, White.
trackback


For forty years, the United States has lived with a variety of government programs applying preferential treatment based on race or gender or both. These programs have generally been limited to education and public contracting.

Recently, in a 2-1 decision, a panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals handed down a decision which may provide a foundation for applying preferential treatment to freedom of speech. If allowed to stand, the decision could authorize local governments to set varying limits to free expression, depending on the race, religion, or sexual orientation of the listener.

Preferential treatment has proved one of the most divisive policies of modern America. The Ninth Circuit’s decision could radically expand its scope.

Harper v. Poway Unified School District grew out of a decision by a San Diego area high school to hold a “Day of Silence” to “teach tolerance of others, particularly those of a different sexual orientation” (in the words of its Assistant Principal). Participating students wore duct tape over their mouths to symbolize the silencing effect of intolerance. Others wore black T-shirts bearing a purple square and a yellow equal sign. The Gay-Straight Alliance, with the school’s permission, put posters “promoting awareness of harassment on the basis of sexual orientation.”

Not all students supported the Day of Silence. Tyler Harper arrived wearing a T-shirt reading “I WILL NOT ACCEPT WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED” on one side, and “HOMOSEXUALITY IS SHAMEFUL ‘Romans 1:27′” on the other. The next day, his T-shirt read: “BE ASHAMED, OUR SCHOOL EMBRACED WHAT GOD HAS CONDEMNED.” School authorities considered the T-shirt “inflammatory” and refused to allow Harper to wear it on campus. When he would not remove it, they confined him to a school conference room. He spent part of the day doing homework, and part discussing the Bible and the T-shirt with school officials and a deputy sheriff. After the last period, Harper was instructed to proceed directly off campus.

Harper sued the school district on First Amendment and other grounds. He sought a preliminary injunction barring the district from “continuing its violation of [his] constitutional rights.” After the district court denied the motion, Harper appealed.

This was not an easy case. The school had experienced disruptions and altercations during a previous Day of Silence, and officials were anxious to avoid trouble. Despite his disobedience, Harper was not disciplined in any way. He received full attendance credit for his day confined to the conference room.

The Ninth Circuit might have upheld the school officials’ actions in a number of value-neutral ways. Free speech in public schools is not as broadly protected as free speech outside. The court might have cited the school’s right to restrict any speech, regardless of viewpoint, if likely to cause substantial disruption. The court might have cited the high procedural burden of obtaining preliminary injunctive relief in the absence of threatened injury. With the Day of Silence over, and no future Day imminent, the court might have ruled that Harper had simply failed to meet his burden.

But that is not how the Ninth Circuit treated Harper’s appeal. Instead, in a 2-1 decision, Judge Reinhardt used the case to articulate a new concept of free speech regulation. Focusing on the specific anti-gay content of Harper’s T-shirt, he ruled that schools may restrict “derogatory and injurious remarks directed at students’ minority status such as race, religion, and sexual orientation.” In a footnote, he wrote that the court would “leave … to another time” the question of limiting derogatory remarks aimed at gender. But Judge Reinhardt proceeded to establish a new constitutional calculus, under which the protectability of speech would depend on the minority status of the listener.

Judge Reinhardt wrote that a different standard should apply to derogatory remarks aimed at “majority groups such as Christians or whites” because “there is, of course, a difference between a historically oppressed minority group that has been the victim of serious prejudice and discrimination and a group that has always enjoyed a preferred social, economic and political status.”

Perhaps there is, but it is not a difference recognized in the Bill of Rights. The Supreme Court has upheld, under limited circumstances, the right of states to grant preferential treatment to minorities in access to education and public contract opportunities. In a 2003 decision involving Michigan Law School, former Justice Sandra Day O’Connor observed that 25 years of racial preferences may be necessary to achieve equality. But she was addressing a state school admissions policy. When given the chance, voters have regularly rejected such programs. If, as Judge Reinhardt found, constitutional rights themselves may be allotted to the people on a preferential basis depending on minority status, such preferences may be beyond democratic challenge by the voters.

In his dissent, Judge Kozinski pointed to the practical difficulties of applying Reinhardt’s novel concept. If the Pope condemns gay marriage, could a student wear a T-shirt reading “CATHOLICS ARE BIGOTS”? On the one hand, Catholics are a minority with a long history of oppression in this country. So they would seem to qualify for Judge Reinhardt’s preferential treatment. But Catholics are part of the larger Christian faith, which Judge Reinhardt described as having “always enjoyed a preferred social, economic and political status.” Blacks are a minority nationally, but in many school districts they constitute a majority. May a white student wear a T-shirt bearing an anti-black message in a nearly all black school, since the white student would be a minority in that context?

Beyond the problems of defining who receives extra protection and who is subject to extra restriction, there is this unsettling thought: If freedom of speech depends on the minority status of the listener, what about the other enumerated constitutional rights? Why stop at the First Amendment? The Bill of Rights contains nine more.

The Second Amendment protects gun ownership. Are Jews entitled to easier access to guns in view of their history as victims of violence? The Fourth Amendment provides that no property may be taken for public use without just compensation. Are Japanese-Americans entitled to greater monetary compensation in eminent domain cases, in view of their forced relocation during World War II? For each component of the Bill of Rights, one can make a historical case for granting some groups greater entitlement than others. If the Ninth Circuit’s decision stands, and if assorted factions vie for the title of “historically oppressed minority group,” the courts may end up facing just such cases.

The Supreme Court displays a particular interest in Ninth Circuit constitutional adjudication. While the Ninth Circuit is one of 13 federal appellate courts, its rulings account for one fifth of the High Court’s docket. Last year, the Supreme Court reviewed 18 Ninth Circuit decisions, while considering only seven cases from the Second Circuit. Of the 18 reviewed, the Supreme Court reversed or vacated 15, 12 by unanimous votes.

Harper v. Poway Unified School District is not over. Harper has requested en banc review, a procedure in which the decision of a 3-judge panel is reviewed by the chief judge and 10 other judges. En banc review is granted in cases involving questions of “exceptional importance.” The question of whether freedom of speech may be allotted based on race, religion, or sexual practice would seem to qualify for such examination. If en banc review is denied, or if the holding remains after such review, then the Supreme Court may choose to have the last word on a Ninth Circuit matter — again.

Source: TCS Daily

Advertisements
%d bloggers like this: